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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 28-29, 2016

SIEPR
Koret-Taube Conference Center
Stanford University
366 Galvez Street
Stanford, CA

Program

[Participant List](#)

Friday, October 28

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|----------|--|
| 8:30 am | Continental Breakfast |
| 9:00 am | Darrell Duffie, Stanford University and NBER
Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Size Discovery |
| | Ahmad Peivandi, Georgia State University
Participation and Unbiased Pricing in CDS Settlement Mechanisms |
| 10:30 am | Break |
| 11:00 am | Laura Doval, Yale University
A Theory of Stability in Dynamic Matching Markets |
| | Hugo Hopenhayn, University of California at Los Angeles and NBER
Maryam Saeedi, Carnegie Mellon University
Bidding Dynamics in Auctions |
| 12:30 pm | Lunch |
| 2:00 pm | Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder
Thayer Morrill, North Carolina State University
Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns |
| | Tibor Heumann, Princeton University
Ascending Auctions with Multidimensional Signals |
| 3:30 pm | Break |

4:00 pm John Hatfield, University of Texas at Austin
 Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
[Hidden Substitutes](#)

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Deferred Acceptance Auctions Without Substitutes

5:30 pm Adjourn

6:30 pm Dinner
 Il Fornaio Restaurant
 520 Cowper Street
 Palo Alto, CA

Saturday, October 29

8:30 am Continental Breakfast

9:00 am Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University
 Ilya Segal, Stanford University
[Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities](#)

Songzi Du, Simon Fraser University
[Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation](#)

10:30 am Break

11:00 am Shengwu Li, Stanford University
[Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms](#)

Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles
 Peter Troyan, University of Virginia
[Obvious Dominance and Random Priority](#)

12:30 pm Lunch

2:00 pm Benjamin Roth, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University
[Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design](#)

Michal Feldman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
 Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University
 Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research
 Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
 Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research
[Efficiency Guarantees in Large Markets](#)

3:30 pm Break

4:00 pm David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne
 Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
 Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford
[Refugee Resettlement](#)

Tommy Andersson, Lund University

Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal

[*Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings*](#)

5:30 pm

Adjourn

FORMAT: [Authors should plan to speak for approximately 30-35 minutes.](#)